Are Hong Kong elections a preview of Chinese democratic reforms?

China’s decision to allow Hong Kong to elect its own chief executive in 2017 and the entire legislature in 2020 is a momentous step forward, both for Hong Kong and for China, although Hong Kong’s pan-democrats do not seem to realize it.

On December 29, the standing committee of the National People’s Congress—China’s parliament—ruled out universal suffrage in 2012 but decided to allow it five years later for election of the chief executive and eight years later for the legislature.

It is unprecedented for the Chinese government to take this step. Although the Basic Law, Hong Kong’s mini-constitution enacted by China’s National People’s Congress in 1990, declared that universal suffrage was the “ultimate aim” for the election of both the chief executive and the legislature, up to now Beijing had no specific timetable for when this would happen.

In 2003, China was shocked when more than half a million people marched in protest against antisubversion legislation and to demand democracy. It was not prepared to grant it at that time and made it clear that its idea of when the “ultimate aim” could be achieved was some time down the road. However, in the past few years it has come to realize that the issue of democracy was going to prove destabilizing for both Hong Kong and China unless it was resolved.

Evidently, Hong Kong’s chief executive, Donald Tsang, succeeded in convincing the central government that unless the issue was resolved, it would make governance difficult for all future chief executives. Currently, the chief executive is chosen by an election committee of 800 people.

Tsang, during his campaign for reelection last year, promised to thoroughly resolve this issue during his second term, and China’s leaders complimented him on this campaign promise—an indication that they were not opposed to the idea that there was a need to finally grasp this nettle.

Hong Kong’s democrats are now saying that Chinese leaders should mandate universal suffrage in 2017 and 2020 rather than just saying that they will allow it to happen. But that implies that the central government should intervene deeply in Hong Kong’s affairs by laying down the law as to what the electoral models should be—something that Beijing appears content to leave to Hong Kong for now. Eventually, of course, Beijing will still have to endorse whatever is agreed to within Hong Kong.

The Basic Law makes it clear that universal suffrage should be attained “in accordance with the principle of gradual and orderly progress”. When the democrats, with their 25 votes in the legislature, rejected an interim reform package for the 2007-08 elections, it became impossible to expect universal suffrage by the very next elections, since then it could not be argued that this was the result of “gradual and orderly progress”.

Even now, although Beijing has endorsed 2017, it is still possible that universal suffrage may be delayed. That is because any model for 2012 must be approved by two-thirds of the legislature, and if there is no agreement, then universal suffrage will be stalled again.

Much work will need to be done in the coming years, no doubt with huge arguments between the various political groupings. The immediate task will be to decide on electoral reforms in 2012 for both the chief executive and the legislature—decisions that will require the approval of Beijing.

After that come other, even more difficult hurdles as the various groups within Hong Kong discuss and decide how to go about holding universal-suffrage elections for chief executive in 2017—again, decisions that have to win Beijing’s support.

In the meantime, decisions will also need to be made about the legislative elections in 2016, the last ones before universal suffrage in 2020.

And, finally, decisions will have to be made regarding the 2020 legislative elections themselves, including whether Hong Kong should retain a unicameral system or move to a bicameral system, and whether functional seats—controlled by special interests, such as professional bodies—will be retained in some form.

So Hong Kong has its work cut out for it over the next dozen years. There is no time to lose. It is time to stop bickering and get down to the work at hand.

In the meantime, the demand within China itself for greater democracy will grow as Hong Kong moves to universal suffrage. Ultimately, the Chinese Communist Party will have to face a much more challenging task: what to do about democracy on the mainland.

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